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1 Introduction
Talk of whether there exists a fundamental basis to the world pervades contemporary
metaphysics. Increasingly prominent in the metaphysics literature are arguments as
to whether the world resolves itself into a set of fundamental objects or whether, on
the contrary, each object is composed of more fundamental objects ad infinitum.1 But
there is a school of thought that takes it that, whatever its outcome, this whole debate
gets off on the wrong foot, since this school denies that fundamentality ought to be
construed in terms of objects at all. According to its proponents, even if there should
exist a set of ‘fundamental objects’ – in the sense of a set of entities privileged with
respect to other members of the category of objects, such as the fundamental particles
or fields described in our best physics – it is not the case that such objects would qualify
as truly fundamental. Rather, in their view, the most basic metaphysical level of the
world is constituted solely by the structures that our best physics theories describe.2
The thesis just outlined is that of radical ontic structuralism. Indeed, ontic structural-
ism in general is often explicitly characterized in fundamentality terms, and in partic-
ular as a thesis concerning ontological priority. In his survey article for the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example, James Ladyman characterizes ontic struc-
turalism (often denoted ‘OSR’) on its ‘broadest construal’ as ‘any form of structural
realism based on an ontological or metaphysical thesis that inflates the ontological
priority of structure and relations.’3 It is thus a novel priority claim concerning the
status that structures enjoy relative to objects that we may take to be most definitive of
structuralist metaphysics.4
1See eg. Cameron [2008]; Schaffer [2003].
2French and Ladyman [2003], p. 27.
3Ladyman [2007]. Likewise, Esfeld and Lam state that ‘the issue of the relationship between objects
and relations within OSR has mainly been addressed in the literature in terms of ontological primacy’
(Esfeld and Lam [2010], p. 145).
4In what follows, by ‘objects’ I will mean the bearers of determinate physical properties – the
paradigmatic examples in the particle physics context being of course particles and fields. However,
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Ladyman himself is a structuralist of the radical stripe. But since structuralists hold
that mainstream metaphysics is highly ‘object oriented’, they will hold that a position
that fell short of imparting a superior status to structure, but simply raised it to the
status of objects, would on this construal qualify as just as legitimate a form of ontic
structuralism as one that held the stronger ‘superiority’ view. There are thus two dis-
cernible structuralist positions that may be defined with regard to priority. There is, on
the one hand, the radical position in which structures enjoy an unreciprocated, one-
way priority over objects – a situation which they claim sanctions the elimination of
objects qua elements of fundamental, hence properly philosophical, ontology.5 There
is, on the other hand, the so-called moderate position in which the two categories are
taken to be ‘ontologically on a par’ with one another, so that – to the extent that it
makes sense to speak of ‘priority’ at all – these priority relations are reciprocated.6
Thus while the radical view takes it that ‘relational structure is more ontologically
fundamental than objects’, according to the moderate view objects and structures are
‘on the same ontological footing, being given “at once” in the sense that they are mutu-
ally ontologically dependent on each other.’7 The radical structuralist therefore holds
that the fundamental basis of the world consists exclusively of structures, while the
moderate structuralist sees an indispensible role for objects in that basis as well.
It is the claims regarding an elevated priority status for structures that is most distinc-
tive of OSR. But how exactly the priority alluded is to be understood has not received
a great deal of attention in the structuralist literature – something that is rather anoma-
lous given its evident centrality to the doctrine as a whole.8 Moreover, on those occa-
sions in which efforts have been made to spell out priority, they are often ambiguous,
with different and inequivalent characterizations being used interchangeably. Hawley
for example has thereby objected that ‘the ways in which structures are somehow prior
to objects’ – and thus what it means for structure to be ontologically fundamental and
for objects by contrast to fail to be ‘self-subsistent’ – have not been clearly articulated.9
If structuralism is to present itself as a viable alternative to the predominant ‘object ori-
ented’ metaphysics and its attendant fundamentality assumptions, precisifying priority
ought therefore to be put at the top of its agenda.
exactly how structuralists ought to define structure in general has proved to be a much more controver-
sial matter. In what follows, I will appeal only to two specific examples that are held up as paradigms
of structures in physics – namely entanglement relations and group-theoretic structures – and will not
offer any general definition. To be clear, however, these structures are to be understood as interpreted,
and not merely in terms of what is preserved under isomorphisms.
5See e.g. Ladyman [1998], French and Ladyman [2003a]. For statements on how the secondary
status of objects prompts their elimination, see French [2010]; Ladyman and Ross [2007], Chapter 3.
6See e.g. Esfeld and Lam [2008]; Esfeld [2004]. I appreciate that it is awkward to speak of recipro-
cated or ‘symmetric’ priority when the word ‘priority’ connotes asymmetry. The use of this term may
be put down to a widespread bias against symmetric dependence relations – a bias I reject – but I think
it best to use the extant terminology nonetheless.
7Esfeld and Lam [2008]; see also their [2010], p. 146.
8A recent and notable exception to this is French [2010], which lays out some of the options but
remains uncommitted on how priority is to be understood; nor is Fine’s approach considered, though I
will argue that it is a natural candidate. Linnebo [2008] also discusses priority, though in the context of
mathematical structuralism.
9Hawley [2008].
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The purpose of this paper is to do exactly that. I will begin by considering how the
notion of priority may best be articulated, given that it is to play a definitive role within
OSR. With that in place, I will then examine whether any of structuralism’s priority
claims can be regarded as supported. Since structuralism’s most revisionary claims
regard what is fundamental, I will focus on two case studies that concern fundamental
particles (each of which receives considerable attention in the structuralist literature):
first, the case of entangled quantum particles, and second, the group-theoretic concep-
tion of elementary particles. In each case, I will consider whether either of structural-
ism’s radical and moderate versions represents a feasible interpreration of these cases,
and from there, whether either represents a viable alternative to the standard ‘object
oriented’ vision of what is ontologically fundamental. I therefore begin by thinking
about how exactly to conceive of priority in the context set by ontic structualism.
2 The Right Priority Relation for Structuralism:
Supervenience or Dependence?
Since priority lies at the heart of ontic structuralism, the priority relation most appro-
priate to it will ideally be reflective of structuralist metaphysics as a whole. Struc-
turalist philosophy of physics is motivated by no one single fact or thesis but rather by
a whole constellation of ideas, and as such it incorporates a variety of metaphysical
concerns.10 In spite of the breadth of these considerations, however, two broad meta-
physical themes may be traced throughout the discussions surrounding them. There
is, of course, a principal claim concerning the ontological priority relations that exist
between objects and structures, and it is the issue of how exactly structuralists should
understand this claim that we will try to come to grips with. But to do that, we must
note that there is a second core theme to structuralism – namely, that objects are to
be reconceptualized in terms that make ineliminable reference to the dynamical struc-
tures in which those objects participate.11 While I will not attempt here to spell out
explicitly what this ‘reconceptualization’ amounts to, I will contemplate how we ought
to understand priority, given that both of these claims constitute major themes in ontic
structuralism.
So how should structuralists understand priority? No doubt the most familiar way
in which contemporary philosophers express ideas about ontological privilege is by
invoking supervenience relations, and as one might expect sometimes structuralists
themselves likewise frame things in exactly these terms. Ladyman and Ross, for ex-
ample, write that
OSR is the view that the world has an objective modal structure that is
ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening on the intrinsic
10See Ladyman [2007] for discussion.
11French and Ladyman, for example, write that they ‘are not “anti-ontology” in the sense of urging a
move away from electrons, elementary particles etc. [...] rather, [they] urge the reconceptualization of
electrons, elementary particles and so forth in structural instead of individualistic terms.’ (French and
Ladyman [2003], p. 37). See also Bokulich [2010], p. xiv.
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properties of a set of individuals.12
So it is clear that sometimes structuralists vouch for supervenience as the right way
to cash out their fundamentality claims. On the other hand, and more often perhaps,
structuralists allude to relations of dependence to articulate what they mean by priority.
French, for example,
take[s] it that a core feature of OSR is the claim that putative ‘objects’ are
dependent in some manner upon the relevant relations (and hence these
putative objects can be reconceptualized as mere nodes in the relevant
structure).13
(Note another allusion to ‘reconceptualization’ here.) So given that both of these re-
lations are evidently in play in the literature, there is the question of which, if either,
is the better relation with which to express priority. And what we should definitely be
clear on, in any case, is that the two cannot simply be used interchangeably: not only
are supervenience and dependence conceptually quite distinct – the former being most
naturally viewed as a sufficient condition for the existence of the non-fundamental and
the latter a (type of) necessary condition – one may moreover argue that the two fail
to be co-extensive with one another.14
So let us contemplate for a moment how the two relations compare.15 I have already
mentioned that supervenience is by now very familiar, and it is also deemed to be
amply clear. But the idea that supervenience can be used to cash out priority has of
course also had its critics, and these often focus on the idea that supervenience is not
at all explanatory of any relationship between the sub- and supervenient relata; it is
often regarded as at best an indication that it is worth looking for an explanation of
the evident connection between them, while not at all explanatory of it.16 Now, that
need not be a criticism in itself, of course – one can in fact imagine situations in which
it might be positively advantageous, such as when it is believed that there is no such
explanation to be had.17 But insofar as it posits a relation between things without
giving us any indication of why it holds, it may be difficult to stomach the idea that
supervenience gives us the last word on fundamentality.
On the other hand, it is fair to say that the predicament with dependence has been al-
most the diametric opposite: while dependence is taken to have some deep connection
with explanation, it has frequently not been seen as sufficiently clear. As evidence for
this, one could cite the fact that Lewis – in one of his many papers attempting to define
12Ladyman and Ross [2007], p. 130; my italics.
13French [2010], p. 104; my italics.
14A full discussion of the distinctness of the two relations may be found in Yoshimi [2007].
15To avoid potential confusion, I should point out that although it is common to lay down a priori
restrictions on the logical form of either relation, I am not going to do so here, and in particular I am not
going to demand that dependence must be asymmetric (Fine likewise permits symmetric dependence;
see Fine [1995a], Section III). Thus as far as I am concerned, either relation could be used to express
both the radical and the moderate position.
16See Kim [1993], especially pages 146, 148 and 156, and works cited therein.
17Emergentists of various stripes believe that there are such cases.
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intrinsicality – commented that ‘if we had a clear enough understanding of “soley in
virtue of” [a cognate of “dependent upon”], we would need no further definition of
“intrinsic”’.18 But it seems to be the case that philosophers have grown more sanguine
about dependence in recent years, and that it is increasingly regarded as something
that we do have a good enough working grasp of. (This is indeed seemingly evidenced
by the number of new dependence-based analyses of intrinsicality that are now on the
market.)19 Whatever it is that accounts for this change, if there are good reasons to
be more sanguine, then it appears that dependence – unlike supervenience – gets ‘a
tick in both boxes’ insofar as it is regarded as both sufficiently clear and appropriately
explanatory, and we might want to endorse it on these grounds.
Whatever virtues either relation might have in the abstract, however, the principled
question we should be asking in this context is which is the right relation for struc-
turalism; and a little more thought will deliver that it is almost certainly dependence
that is the more apt of the two. Recall that I pressed at the start of this section that
structuralism is more than just a priority claim: it is also an invocation for us to recon-
ceptualize object-based ontology in some way that integrates structures. It is in that
sense revisionary with respect to the nature of objects as well as to their supposed
priority, and both of these are part of the structuralist deal. But if we don’t want the
priority claim and the proposed reconceptualization to constitute independent theses,
then supervenience is not what we are looking for as a means of expressing priority.
Half the point of invoking supervenience is, after all, to liberate priority attributions
from specific claims regarding the nature of the relata – which is why people can claim
that categories so wildly distinct as the modal, the moral and the mental all supervene
on the natural and have all these claims amount to basically the same thing.20 But if,
on the other hand, we want the two key metaphysical aspects of structuralism to come
as a package – and hence for the priority claims to be in some sense ‘tied to the nature
of the dependent entity’, a nature which structuralism itself will elucidate – then there
is an obvious candidate for conceptualizing priority in structuralism. It is, after all, the
idea that priority attributions ought to issue from the nature of the dependent entity
that is distinctive of Fine’s analysis of ontological dependence.
What I think we ought to do at this point, then, is put the talk of supervenience behind
us and take a closer look at what exactly is involved in the account of dependence just
alluded to, since such an account has the resources to bind together structuralism’s two
core ontological themes. With that in place, I will address how structuralists might
explicitly invoke Fine’s account to promote into real demonstrations what it seems fair
to say have, in the absence of a clear and unambiguous understanding of what is meant
by ‘priority’, largely just been plausibility arguments for the priority of structure over
objects (and, where appropriate, vice versa).21 So with that, let me now expand a little
18Lewis [2001], p. 384. See also Lewis [1983], p. 29.
19On the defence, see Jenkins [forthcoming]. On intrinsicality, see Rosen [2010], Witmer et al.
[2005].
20That is, supervenience is seen as ‘entirely topic neutral’ (Kim [1993], p. 132).
21For example, and with regard to the latter point, the extant major argument for the moderate over
the radical position hinges on the idea that ‘relations require relata, that is, things which stand in the
relations’ (see e.g. Esfeld [2004], Esfeld and Lam [2009]). However, the nature of this requirement is
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more on ontological dependence and, in particular, Fine’s account of it.
3 Introducing Ontological Dependence
If we go with our first intuitions on the matter, we will want to say that an entity x is
ontologically dependent upon an entity y just if x exists only if y exists. It additionally
seems clear that this should hold with metaphysical necessity (for if there were a world
in which x could after all exist without y we would presumably want to retract that x
was dependent upon it). To a first approximation, then, we may say that an entity x
is ontologically dependent upon an entity y just if, necessarily, x exists only if y does,
where the force of the necessity is metaphysical.22
Intuitive though it may seem at a first pass, the starting point for Fine’s analysis is that
such a simple and purely modal construal of ontological dependence in fact turns out
to be hopeless; it is simply not fine-grained enough to exclude some patently spurious
cases.23 As already indicated, Fine proposes in its place an analysis in which
The necessity of the conditional ‘x exists only if y does’ should be appro-
priately tied to the nature of the dependent item x,24
from which it follows that such conditionals are ‘not necessary simpliciter’ but are ad-
ditionally ‘tied’ in some sense to the nature of their relata. Now, the ‘natures’ involved
in this ‘tying’ are to be understood in terms that are at least close to what has tradition-
ally been associated with essence – for Fine’s analysis is indeed explicitly essentialist.
This raises an immediate concern, however, for we probably do have to grant to French
that ‘essentialism has not typically been viewed all that favourably in the context of
modern physics.’25 Hence we face the worry that, by invoking Fine’s theory in discus-
sions of structuralism in physics, we are attempting to shoe-horn a very contemporary
ontology into a hallowed framework that was not designed to accommodate it. It is
perhaps partly for this reason that structuralist discussions of priority have tended to
focus on the notion of identity without any mention of essence – the former being
deemed to connote something altogether more innocuous than the latter.26
However, I would argue that keeping the discussion confined to identity considera-
tions to the exclusion of this thing called ‘essence’ is neither realistic nor necessary.
not spelled out, and seems perfectly consistent with relations necessitating the existence of relata but as
an ontologically secondary phenomenon. It is after all presumably this circumstance that French and
Ladyman have in mind when they invoke Cassirer’s conception of objects as the ‘points of intersection’
of relations (French and Ladyman [2003a].)
22See Fine [1995a] for discussion of and references to modal accounts.
23See however Wildman [unpublished].
24Fine [1995a], p. 272.
25French [2010], p. 106. This is in part because essentialist doctrines in the philosophy of science
have tended to be tied up in the language of dispositions, and hence of cause and effect – concepts that
are problematic to say the least in the context of fundamental physics.
26Thus while French’s discussion of dependence in structuralism cites the notion of ‘essential depen-
dence’, he has little more to say than that ‘the essence of an object is closely bound up with its identity’,
and thus effectively reverts to discussing identity dependence (French [2010], p. 101).
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Talk of ontological dependence is after all metaphysical talk, and thus the fact that
physics never speaks explicitly of essence need not constitute any reason to shun it.
Furthermore, and as Lowe has argued, talk of the ‘identity dependence’ that struc-
turalists seem more comfortable with apparently still requires us to ultimately invoke
something close to essence if we are to put constraints (as we must) on what sort of
properties should feature in the analysis of the identity of an entity.27 But more posi-
tively, we should, I think, be open to the possibility that essence too may be relatively
innocuous in the sorts of structuralist contexts that we will be working within here. It
may turn out, in fact, that what Fine has in mind by ‘essence’ is just the sort of thing
that we’re used to dealing with all the time in particle physics. But before I can assert
any of that, of course, I need to clarify what commitment to essence involves, and to
do so I will defer to a recent and useful survey article on contemporary approaches to
ontological dependence. Here, Correia writes that
The conception of essence Fine has in mind is a traditional conception ac-
cording to which what is essential to an object pertains to what the object
is, or defines the object (at least in part).28
This we will take as our starting point. Now, perhaps the two conceptions of essence
just alluded to are intended in a somewhat technical sense in which they come out as
synonymous, but it doesn’t seem so, and at a first pass they do seem to invoke dif-
ferent things – both of which we intuitively want to be brought into the discussion.
If we understand the first characterization in the statement as meaning ‘pertaining to
what the object is, as opposed to what it is not’, we seem to have invoked matters of
individuation and hence of properties that might confer distinctness or individuality
– something that philosophers of physics are routinely happy to discuss. But since
definitions need not be individuating, this needn’t be the same thing as defining the
object.29 Indeed, in particle physics we usually take defining an object to be a mat-
ter of listing off the determinate, fundamental, state-independent properties common
to all members of the particle’s kind, all of which are indistinguishable with respect
to these properties. These properties physicists usually call ‘intrinsic’ properties, but
– as Ladyman and Ross remind us – they correspond much more naturally to what
philosophers would call ‘essential’ properties (partly because such properties are al-
ways, among other things, permanent and observer-independent).30
So given that preliminary reassurance, and in keeping with Correia’s rough-and-ready
criterion, we can say, to a first approximation, that the properties we should take to
feature in a particle’s essence are
• The fundamental, determinate, state-independent properties that serve to define
its kind; and
27Lowe [1998], p. 148.
28Correia [2008], p. 1018; italics in original. Note that it is better to speak of ‘entities’ than ‘objects’
here; more on this below.
29See Fine op. cit., p. 275. Whether a definition is individuating or not will depend on its relationship
to a pre-agreed principle of individuation. Compare, say, the definition of a set in terms of its members,
and the definition of an electron in terms of its having mass m, charge e and spin s.
30Ladyman and Ross [2007], p. 134.
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• (Some of) the properties involved in conferring distinctness from other members
of its kind.
I will leave the latter very vague, as I will not go into much depth about how essence
and individuation fit together; all I am going to do is invoke a couple of theorems of
Fine’s as and when we need them. But hopefully I have done enough to dispel at least
some of the initial misgivings about what essence might involve in the fundamental
physics context, and with that, let me introduce Fine’s system.
4 Fine’s System
The first thing to be clear on is that Fine’s analysis of ontological dependence is in-
tended as completely general in scope, incorporating dependencies between (among
other things) objects, properties, numbers, sets, persons, and states of things at a time.
Thus it is unfortunate – and especially so in the current context – that Fine often uses
the term ‘object’ to refer to the relata of dependence relations when the more generic
‘entity’ would be a better term. So while to preserve ease of reading I will not replace
‘object’ with ‘entity’ in the ensuing quotes from Fine, the reader should be clear that
Fine’s theory is to apply to (possible) entities of any category and is not restricted to
the category of objects alone; in the structuralist case studies, however, references to
objects should be understood as references to entities in the category of objects and
thus to entities distinct from those in category of structures.31
What we must acquaint ourselves with next is Fine’s primitive operator ‘x’, which
generates the prefix ‘it is true in virtue of the identity of x that’:
x =de f it is true in virtue of the identity of x that
The idea behind this operator is that when it operates on a predication φ of an object
x, it generates the proposition that φ is an essential property of x:
xφ(x) =de f φ is an essential property of x.
As I have already pointed out, Fine takes essential attributions to be more discriminat-
ing than necessary attributions, and as a consequence he
accept[s] that if an object essentially has a certain property then it is nec-
essary that it has that property (or has the property if it exists); but [he]
reject[s] the converse,32
and it is clear that we can schematize the part he accepts as follows:
xφ(x)→ (Ex→ φ(x)), (1)
31I thank Kit Fine for clarifying this point.
32Fine [1994], p. 4.
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which says that if an entity is essentially φ, then its necessary that it is φ if it exists.
Here, following Fine and the standard literature on dependence I use this ‘E’ to denote
‘the existence predicate’.33 As Correia notes for us again, this schema is basically
uncontested in the debate and here I will call it the ‘basic schema’. Now, given that
the necessary truths that we obtain in this way are ‘not necessary simpliciter’ but ‘flow
from the nature of the objects in question’, we may say that the necessity attached to
the consequent here is itself reflective of the nature of x.34 It follows that φ’s being an
essential property of x plus the basic schema implies
xφ(x)→ x(Ex→ φ(x)), (2)
which states that it is essential to an entity that if it exists, it is φ.35 I’ve also said that,
for Fine, ‘ontological dependence should be tied to the nature of the dependent entity’,
which we can now express as
x(Ex→ Ey), (3)
which is Fine’s analysis of the statement that x ontologically depends upon y. So what
I will try to do in what follows is derive statements of this form, with objects and
structures in the appropriate positions, from what I have called the basic schema.
In order to do that, two more things will be required. First of all, when it is the natures
of two entities that are involved in some dependence, we need a suitable generalization
of the basic schema, and this is presumably
x,yψ(x, y)→ x,y((Ex&Ey)→ ψ(x, y)), (4)
which says that if ψ holds of x and y in virtue of their essences, then if they exist, ψ is
true of them. For the same reasons as before, we may infer from this, plus the fact that
ψ holds essentially of them, that
x,y((Ex&Ey)→ ψ(x, y)) (5)
is true, which says that it follows from the natures of x and y that if they exist, then ψ
is true of them. There is also the corresponding statement of ontological dependence
of a pair x and y on some z:
x,y((Ex&Ey)→ Ez). (6)
As well as these generalizations to two or more entities, we are going to need the
notion of the consequential essence, and, according to Fine, the most intuitive way
to grasp this notion is via the concept of the constitutive essence (though we should
note that ultimately the constitutive essence may be dispensed with to leave a purely
consequence-based account).36 As Fine puts matters:
33See for example Correia [2008], p. 1017. To be clear, Fine does not regard ‘∃y(y = x)’ to ade-
quately express ‘x exists’; rather than endorsing a quantificational conception of existence, he argues
for a predicational conception instead. See Fine [2009] for an exposition of his view.
34Fine [1995b] pp. 7–8.
35Though I will not show it here, this is a theorem of Fine’s system and may be demonstrated through
the principles laid down in Fine [1995b]. I would like to express my gratitude to Fabrice Correia for
providing me with the proof.
36See Fine [1995a], Section II.
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A property belongs to the constitutive essence of an object if it is not
had in virtue of being a logical consequence of some more basic essential
properties; and a property might be said to belong to the consequential
essence of an object if it is a logical consequence of properties that belong
to the constitutive essence. [...] Thus a property of containing Socrates as
a member will presumably be part of the constitutive essence of singleton
Socrates, whereas the property of containing some member or other will
presumably only be part of its consequential essence.37
Intuitive as that may be, we have unfortunately still got work to do in defining the
consequential essence – for, as Fine concedes, as it stands the proposed definition
of consequence will be useless (and this relates to the idea that the essential is more
fine-grained than necessary). This is because the property of being the same as, or
distinct from, any object (or better, ‘entity’) y will be a logical consequence of any
proposition about any given object, and so will form part of the consequential essence
of anything. It will follow that everything depends on everything else – clearly an
awkward result. What is needed is ‘an independent way of distinguishing between
those objects that enter into the consequential essence as a result of logical closure and
those that enter in ‘their own right’, i.e. by way of the constitutive essence,’ and to this
end Fine proposes that we impose a test on the logical consequences of any essential
attribution.38 The test for x to be said to depend upon y is that y cannot be ‘generalized
out’ of the consequentialist essence of x, or, in other words, that x will depend upon
y ‘just in case some proposition P(y) belongs to the essence without its generalization
belonging to the essence.’39
While the motivation for this test is clear enough, it is also apparent that if we are to
gain any purchase on which truths are universalizable and which not, we must first of
all specify what it is that we take the appropriate domain of quantification to consist
of. Fine states that ‘the quantifier can and, indeed, should be taken to range over
every possible object’ in order to preserve the Barcan principle (which again we take
as the statement that the quantifier ought to range over every possible entity), and it
is clear that if Fine’s thesis is to be of any use to structuralism, then the domain had
better include any of the structures that may be deemed relevant in the metaphysics
of present or future fundamental physics (such as laws, groups, metric structures and
so on).40 While that is clear, what is far less so is that we can specify all of these
structures that must feature in the domain in a clear and well-defined way. There may
37Ibid., p. 276.
38Ibid., p. 278.
39Ibid., p. 278. So, for example, ‘although it is part of the consequentialist essence of Socrates that
2 = 2, it is also part of his consequentialist essence that every object whatever is self-identical,’ and
so the number 2 does not after all feature in the singleton’s consequential essence (at least not on this
basis). On the other hand, while it is also a logical consequence of the nature of, say, Socrates’ singleton
that there is something that it contains, it does not logically follow that, for any object whatsoever, that
object is contained. In accordance with Fine’s criterion, then, we recover the idea that the property of
containing something does belong to the consequential essence of Socrates’ singleton set – and hence
to its essence simpliciter.
40Ibid., p. 277.
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therefore be a worry that we will not be in a position to state that a given proposition
P(y) is satisfiable for every y unless we can find a way to specify in advance every y
that should feature in the domain. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the task of securing
positive attributions of dependence will not require us to trawl through every element
of an infinite domain, for if we can find just one entity that we indisputably do want to
be included, but that does not satisfy the proposition, then we will be home and hosed.
So let us try to get along for the moment without worrying too much about how to
specify the domain beyond the fact that it contains all the entities – including all the
objects and structures – that structuralism will want to make use of.
That is basically all that will be needed of Fine’s machinery, so let me now show how
we can get it to work in structuralism. In what remains, I will examine two prominent
case studies in structuralism, beginning with the case of entangled quantum particles
and then the case of the group-theoretic conception of elementary particles, and in each
case use Fine’s analysis to rigorously recover the core structuralist claim that objects
ontologically depend on structures. But I will also address the issue of whether this
dependence is reciprocated, and hence try to make some progress toward adjudicating
between structuralism’s radical and moderate variants.
5 The Dependence of Objects on Structure 1: Entangled Quantum
Particles
As already mentioned, where structuralists have gone into any kind of detail about
the nature of the priority they have in mind it has tended to concern identity; struc-
turalism is indeed often explicitly presented as the thesis that objects lack ‘primitive
identity’.41 Perhaps the most discussed and clearly presented statements of this thesis
revolve around the seminal work by Saunders on Leibniz’s principles and their appli-
cation to physics.42 While this work was judged, by many at least, to undermine the
metaphysical underdetermination claims that had previous motivated the eliminativist
thesis associated with radical structuralism, the same work was redeployed to sustain
the latter’s core priority thesis: while the claim that the structure of quantum relations
ruled out the individuality of fermions was dropped, in its place emerged the claim that
those relations secured individuality only at the price of rendering them ontologically
secondary (and as such, it is claimed, still metaphysically eliminable).43 Ladyman
and Ross, for example, note that in their opinion ‘while Saunders’ view vindicates an
ontology of individuals in the context of QM, it is a thoroughly structuralist one in
so far as individuals are nothing over and above the nexus of relations in which they
stand’.44 They furthermore take this ‘structuralist’ account of particle identity to form
a core plank of the foundation for their ontic structuralism as a whole, a position that
41A review of this approach to structuralism may be found in Section 4 of Ladyman [2007].
42Saunders [2003].
43See e.g. French [1998] and Ladyman [1998] for statements of the underdetermination argument. It
is my understanding that, at present, Ladyman accepts that Saunders’ argument vindicates an ontology
of individuals, while French still holds that the dilemma persists.
44Ladyman and Ross [2007], p. 138.
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consists of ‘a conjunction of eliminativism about self-subsistent individuals, the view
that relational structure is ontologically fundamental, and structural realism.’45 As
already mentioned, however, Hawley has complained that what exactly these claims
amount to is not clear as it stands. Esfeld and Lam have also noted that it is not at
all obvious how the observations regarding identity that Saunders brings to the table
‘could ground an ontological priority of relations over relata.’46 Let me now attempt
to repair this situation by explicitly setting the priority claims that are taken to follow
from Saunders’ discussion into a Finean framework and seeing whether they do indeed
follow.
In order to do so, I must first briefly recap the main thrust of Saunders’ argument.
The issue at hand is identity, and Saunders takes as his starting point the analysis
of identity in a modern logical context. In that context, he argues that the principle
of identity of indiscernibles or ‘PII’ – the statement that if two objects possess all the
same properties and stand in all the same relations to all the same things, then it follows
that they are identical – can be regarded as well-motivated. Indeed, Saunders argues
that the PII may be identifed with (what he calls) the ‘Hilbert-Bernays principle’, and
since he takes the latter to provide an explicit definition of identity it follows that the
PII may equally well be regarded, in this context, as true by definition as well.47
The relevance of this to the specific issue of identity in quantum mechanics may be
put as follows. It is a postulate of quantum mechanics that the states of interacting
indistinguishable (i.e. ‘same kind’) quantum systems must be subject to permutation
invariance – that is, they must be determinately either symmetric or antisymmetric
with respect to the exchange of particle labels, producing either bosons and fermions
respectively.48 This invariance under exchange has the consequence that there is noth-
ing in terms of the essential properties that define their kind, nor in terms of the dy-
namical relationships that they bear to one another, that can be used to distinguish
between the particles in a given state in such a way that we may determinately refer
to any one of them to the exclusion of any of the others. This predicament gave rise
to the ‘Received View’ that quantum particles violated the PII and thus could not be
regarded as individuals.49 Saunders’ insight, however, was that the idea that entangled
quantum particles are thereby indiscernible rests on a view of discernability that is
unduly restrictive. So long as there exists an irreflexive relation between the objects
at hand (a relation which, in the context of permutation invariance, will necessarily be
symmetric), the particles can be regarded as distinct consistently with the PII: it will
not be the case that the objects stand in all the same relations to all the same things
due to the irreflexivity of the symmetric relation. And the relevant states in the case
of fermions – which we regard as the fundamental constituents of matter – are of the
45Ibid., p. 145.
46Esfeld and Lam [2010], p. 148.
47See Saunders op. cit., Section 1. I note that here I am merely presenting Saunders’ argument as
I find it: my principal purpose is to show how priority attributions may be rigorously built upon these
foundations, not to criticize those foundations themselves.
48Paraparticle states are also permitted, but do not seem to be instantiated. I thank a referee for
reminding me of this.
49See, e.g., French and Krause [2006].
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form
1√
2
(ψx(↑)ψy(↓) − ψx(↓)ψy(↑)), (7)
which may be interpreted as meaning that two particles stand in the symmetric but
irreflexive relation of having equal but opposite spin. Objects such as these, which
may be secured as distinct only by appeal to the presence of a symmetric but irreflexive
relation, are said to be weakly discernible.50
That Saunders’ argument yields this much has not been without controversy but is
nonetheless widely accepted. What is by contrast much less clear is how exactly his
argument may be used to underwrite the claim that fermions are thereby somehow
ontologically secondary. By inserting this claim into Fine’s framework, however, we
may justify the claim as follows.
We have agreed that quantum mechanics supplies an irreflexive relation between en-
tangled fermions, and Saunders has shown that objects satisfying such a relation are
distinct. Thus we may write
E(R : Rirre f (x, y))→ x , y, (8)
where I use ‘E(R : Rirre f (x, y))’ to express ‘there exists some irreflexive relation hold-
ing between x and y’.51 What we need now is one of Fine’s theorems connecting
essence and identity that were mentioned before – namely,
x , y→ x,y(x , y). (9)
(To get a sense of what this means, it may be helpful to contrast it with
x = y→ xx = y (10)
and note that, as Fine says, ‘whereas a true identity x = y depends upon the nature
of the one object x, a true non-identity depends upon the nature of both objects’ –
which intuitively seems right.52) So while Saunders’ analysis delivers that entangled
fermions are distinct, Fine’s analysis then tells us that it is essential to them to be
distinct, and we have
x,yx , y. (11)
What else can we deduce to be essential to these objects? Recall that, on the assump-
tion that we are dealing with particles that are at best weakly discernible, it follows
from the PII that if the objects are distinct then there must be an irreflexive relation
between them. To put it schematically, we may write
PII(x, y)→ (x , y→ E(R : Rirre f (x, y))), (12)
50Saunders’ analysis was subsequently extended beyond fermions to bosons (see Muller and Saun-
ders [2008]), but this has proved more controversial.
51French and Krause ([2006], p. 9) suggest there is a ‘worry’ that by apppealing to irreflexive rela-
tions we beg the question; see Hawley [2009], Section 3.2 for discussion of related points. However,
and to repeat, I am here simply presenting Saunders’ argument as I find it.
52Fine [1995b], pp. 255-6.
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where ‘PII(x, y)’ symbolizes that x and y obey the PII (that is, that x and y are identical
if they have all the same properties and stand in all the same relations to all the same
things). Now, as emphasized above, according to Saunders the PII can be regarded as
a definition of identity, so that ‘PII(x, y)’ may be regarded as true by definition as well.
We may thus move from (12) to
x , y→ E(R : Rirre f (x, y)). (13)
Now, we know from (9) that the property of being distinct that features in the an-
tecedent of this expression is essential to x and y. Whatever follows logically from
this property will therefore pertain to the consequential essence of both objects, so
long as the implied proposition cannot be universalized – for that, to recap, is the test
we must apply to see if the implied proposition belongs to the consequential essence.
What is then left to do now is to test whether the corresponding universalized state-
ment can be derived from the non-identity of x and y. Now, while we have remained
quiet on the full content of the domain, we know that structuralists will hold that phys-
ical relations must feature in it. But from the fact that our two particles are distinct
and obey the PII, we of course cannot deduce that every physical relation that the two
particles enter into is irreflexive:
(PII(x, y)&x , y) ; All(R : Rirre f (x, y)); (14)
indeed, ‘being of the same species’ is presumably one physically significant but re-
flexive relation that holds between the (by assumption indistinguishable) x and y. We
may therefore deduce that
x,yE(R : Rirre f (x, y)), (15)
and hence confirm that it is essential to x and y that there exists some irreflexive relation
that they stand in. This, therefore, represents a further essential property of the pair.
Now let us go back to (4), which is what I called the ‘basic schema’ extended to two
objects:
x,yψ(x, y)→ x,y((Ex&Ey)→ ψ(x, y)).
Since we have established that it follows from the natures of x and y that there exists
some irreflexive relation for them to stand in, we may substitute in and write
x,yE(R : Rirre f (x, y))→ x,y((Ex&Ey)→ E(R : Rirre f (x, y))), (16)
or more simply (cf. the move from (4) to (5) above),
x,y((Ex&Ey)→ E(R : Rirre f (x, y))). (17)
But this is just the statement of the ontological dependence of the particles upon ir-
reflexive relations, in accordance with Fine’s definition (6).53 Since structures are sup-
posed to be ‘nexuses of relations’ (vague though that notion no doubt is), we seem to
53Since no particular irreflexive relation is being singled out here, the dependence is a generic depen-
dence (to quote some standard terminology: see Correia [2008]).
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have arrived at just what the structuralists want us to buy into: namely, the ontological
dependence of quantum objects on structures.
The steps that have just been gone through seem to come close to the sought-for
demonstration of the claim that quantum objects depend on structures (and hence are
not ‘self-subsistent’), demonstrated using Fine’s principles. It thus appears that this
flagship statement of structuralism may indeed be sustained. In order to fulfil our ob-
jectives, however, we need to go further and ask whether the radical structuralist claim
that ‘relational structure is more ontologically fundamental than objects’ thereby goes
through (or at least does so in the case of fermions), or whether it is the moderate
position that should be adopted here. Now, it is clear that this question is not settled
by what has so far been shown, for the issue of whether there is any reciprocated
dependence of relations on objects must be investigated before any one position can
be chosen. Whether this reciprocated dependence holds or not will be a function of
how we choose to conceive of relations – in Fine’s picture, on what we think their
nature is – and traditionally of course there have been two ways to do this: we can
either conceive of them extensionally, or we can conceive of them intensionally. But
then it becomes clear that whichever we adopt, the radical structuralist in particular
potentially has a problem.
The reason for this is that if we choose to conceive of relations extensionally, then
given the identity criteria for relations in extension – namely, that two relations are
distinct iff there is an ordered tuple in the extension of one that is not in the extension
of the other – then by deploying exactly the same sort of reasoning as that just gone
through we will be able to deduce that the relations are likewise ontologically depen-
dent on objects.54 By adopting an extensional account of relations, then, the moderate
position would be vindicated.55 Now, all that radical structuralists will take that to im-
ply is that this route must be rejected – indeed, rejected as nothing other than a pillar
in the whole ‘object oriented’ approach to metaphysics that they explicitly denounce.
And that it is an intensional understanding that structuralists like Ladyman have in
mind is in fact sometimes gestured at. In a couple of places, for example, Ladyman
writes
We eschew an extensional understanding of relations [...] According to
Zahar, the continuity in science is in the intension, not the extension, of
its concepts [...]56
Exactly what this is intended to mean does not seem to be fully developed anywhere
in the literature.57 But of course the big problem in the vicinity of any consideration of
this sort is that the whole reason that Quine, for example, rejected intensional entities
was that he deemed it very unclear what their identity criteria were supposed to be.58
54Note that once again we would obtain a generic dependence in this case.
55I note too that Fine’s analysis permits cyclical dependence, which would be the case here: see Fine
[1995a], Section III.
56Ladyman and Ross, p. 128; also Ladyman [1998], p. 418.
57A referee has suggested that it may be connected with the idea that structures possess ‘primitive
modality’.
58See, for example, Quine [1975].
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Now, this is of course not to say that such criteria cannot be provided in principle.
The point is just that such criteria need to be provided, and defended, by structuralists
of the radical stripe if their priority claim is to go through. For although many of
those who defend intensional entities do so not because they think that intensional
entities necessarily have perspicuous and reductive identity conditions, but because
they reject the idea that they must if they are to be philosophically legitimate (and
often on some sort of tu quoque-type grounds), this is not an option that is available
to the radical structuralist (or at least not obviously).59 Why, after all, should it be
deemed obviously acceptable that relations can lack reductive identity conditions and
thus possess primitive identity if the structuralist judges it to be so objectionable in the
case of objects?60
The conclusion at this point can therefore only be stated in conditional form. If an ex-
tensional account of relations is adopted, then it seems that the moderate position wins
out as the right metaphysics of fermions. If, on the other hand, an intensional account
should be adopted, then in lieu of some identity criteria for relations-in-intension and,
in particular, a policy on whether those identities are functions of objects or not, we
simply have no idea whether or not the dependence is reciprocated – hence nor which
structuralist stance is best recommended to us. In other words, without a positive state-
ment on the identity criteria for relations, it seems there is nowhere for this debate to
go.
That structuralists have had so little to say about the matter of the identity conditions
of relations is on reflection a little surprising, given the centrality of both relations
and identity considerations in structuralist metaphysics. And of course, since Fine’s
analysis assumes an understanding of the nature of the relata involved in dependence
attributions, it can be of no help to structuralism in resolving this dispute. What has
nonetheless been positively established by this point is that the flagship claim of struc-
turalism – that objects are dependent on structures – may be shown to go through on
Fine’s conception of dependence. There is thus at least something for us to take home
from this study of quantum mechanics and identity from a Finean point of view.
6 The Priority of Structure 2: The Group-Theoretic Conception
of Elementary Particles
While the case just discussed is perhaps the most vaunted of all of the priority ar-
guments in structuralist philosophy of physics, I want to turn now to another aspect
59See for example Loux [2002], pp. 57–8.
60I am not denying that it may be consistent for a radical structuralist to be a quidditist. But since
identity considerations do so much work in structuralism, and given that proposals for analyses of prop-
erty identities exist (as an example in the intensional case, see Hale [2012]), I do think that structuralists
have to say something by way of explaining why it is that primitive identities are acceptable in the case
of properties and relations, if so objectionable in the case of objects. In any case, some explicit line must
be taken regarding relation identity conditions if radical structuralists are to use Saunders’ argument as
support for their view, but as yet this seems to be lacking.
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of modern physics held up as a poster-child for structuralism – namely, the group-
theoretic conception of fundamental particles. The relevant structure here is the sym-
metry structure of physical laws, and thus the issue at hand is whether such symmetries
may be claimed to be more fundamental than even the so-called fundamental parti-
cles.61 The modern attitude to symmetries arguably emerged in the context of special
relativity, in which Einstein deduced the laws governing free relativistic systems by as-
suming invariance under the Poincare´ transformations; since then, assumptions about
symmetry structure have also been used to derive the laws that govern the fundamen-
tal interactions. While this deductive relationship between symmetries and laws is of
critical importance, another reason why symmetries are paramount in particle physics
is that knowledge of the symmetries associated with a law can also allow us to derive
the particles whose behaviour is described by that law, and it is this that has largely
precipitated the group-theoretic claims that are prominent in the structuralist literature.
Our ability to perform this derivation of elementary particles is grounded in the fact
that the states of physical systems obeying laws of a given symmetry will fall into what
are known as the irreducible representations, or ‘irreps’, of the group associated with
that symmetry. These irreps we may think of as sets of states that are mapped into
one another by the action of the transformations that together comprise the group, so
that an irrep in this sense constitutes a vector space.62 An important property of irreps
is that states from different irreps cannot be mapped into one another by the group
transformations, and the significance of this in the case of, in particular, the Poincare´
group is that the differences between states drawn from different such representations
may not be effaced by a mere change in perspective. It thus makes sense in this context
to regard the states from different irreps of this group to be states of different physical
systems. As such, it was proposed that different irreducible representations of the
Poincare´ group correspond to different species of relativistic particle, and it was in
this way that the connection between symmetries and particle species was born.
To assess the viability of this proposal concerning the intimate connection between
particle types and symmetry groups, what was needed was a classification of the irre-
ducible representations of the Poincare´ group.63 This task was undertaken by Wigner
and – glossing over some of the subtleties that led to certain representations being
discarded – his analysis demonstrated that the irreducible representations, and hence
relativistic particles, should either have
• some determinate mass ∈ R > 0 and spin ∈ Z/2, or
• some determinate mass = 0 and helicity ∈ Z.
61To say that a law possesses a symmetry is to say that there is a set of transformations under which
the form of that law remains invariant, and such a set of transformations may be shown to form a group
in the mathematical sense.
62More than this is in fact required of an irreducible representation – in particular that it contains
no ‘smaller’ representations. But this will do for our purposes just now. Note too that in physics it is
common to refer to these spaces themselves as representations, though strictly speaking they are the
spaces that ‘carry’ the representations.
63Wigner [1939].
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But it turns out that these are precisely the properties that the fundamental particles
do in fact have. The first class describes the electrons, the quarks, the massive bosons
– pretty much everything, in fact, except the photon and gluons, which are in turn
described by the second. All of the elementary particles we know of so far conform
perfectly to this scheme. This spectacular success of the classification of free relativis-
tic particles in terms of the representations of the Poincare´ group caused the general
strategy to be emulated outwith the context of free inertial motion and in the study
of the fundamental interactions, and it has been this study of the symmetry groups
of dynamical laws that has facilitated the successful prediction of whole new families
of fundamental particles. The first three (up, down and strange) quarks, for exam-
ple, were identified with the three states in the fundamental irrep of the SU(3) flavour
group; eleven of the twelve gauge bosons were also predicted through an analysis of
the representations of the local SU(3) and SU(2)⊗U(1) gauge symmetry groups that
are the lynchpin of the Standard Model (the photon was already known).64
This newfound ability to not just describe the particles that we regard as fundamental,
but also to predict their existence and properties, clearly represents an extraordinary
development in our understanding of matter. The strategy outlined above has in gen-
eral been so fruitful, in fact, that one can find prominent physicists saying things such
as
ever since the fundamental paper of Wigner on the irreducible represen-
tations of the Poincare´ group, it has been a (perhaps implicit) definition
in physics that an elementary particle ‘is’ an irreducible representation of
the group, G, of symmetries of nature.65
Such an adage may be found all over the particle physics literature (in one form or
another). It therefore seems that through these manifest successes, physicists have
grown to conceive of an elementary particle as something inherently group-theoretic.
It is of course this conception of fundamental particles that contemporary physicists
now seem to have adopted that structuralists believe should be imported into funda-
mental metaphysics. And the implications of this idea for fundamental metaphysics
are indeed potentially enormous. For one thing, given that fundamental entities are
often taken to be those ‘whose existence and features have no further explanation’,
it is no longer clear that there even are any fundamental particles by this definition
since the properties that particles have, and the way in which they are knitted together,
appear to be explicable via considerations of group structure (at least to a significant
extent).66 It is this apparent consequence that fuels the structuralist claim that even
‘fundamental particles’ are not truly fundamental, and that what should be regarded as
properly fundamental is the symmetry structure, or group structure, that explains their
basic features. The particle physicist and avowed ontic structuralist Kantorovich, for
example, has claimed that these sorts of considerations demonstrate that the represen-
tations of groups, and hence fundamental particles, have ‘a lower ontological status’
64It is interesting to consider why it is that in some situations we take the full representation to
represent a particle and in others only a basis state, but I won’t dwell on that issue here.
65Ne’eman and Sternberg [1991], p. 327; quoted in Roberts [2011].
66deRosset [2010], p. 74.
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than the symmetries themselves.67 Likewise, Lyre takes the above considerations to
‘support structural realism’ on the grounds that
a group theoretic definition of an object takes the group structure as pri-
marily given, group representations are then constructed from this struc-
ture and have a mere derivative status.68
These claims regarding the ‘lower’ or ‘derivative’ status of irreducible representations
seem to be gesturing toward attributions of priority, but so far these claims remain
largely unanalyzed.69 In order to better articulate them, the focus on definition in the
quote above naturally invites us to seek an approach to ontological priority based on
it; but that, of course, is exactly what we have already been considering. Let me
therefore now show how Fine’s conception of dependence may be used to sharpen up
this move from the reconceptualization of objects in group-theoretic terms to novel
claims about priority, focussing for concreteness on the case of the Poincare´ group
and its representations.
If what it is to be an elementary particle is defined in terms of its being an irreducible
representation of the Poincare´ group, then – in accordance with our discussion in Sec-
tion 3 above – that forms part of its essence. Thus, where x is a relativistic particle, we
have
xIRPG(x), (18)
where ‘IRPG(x)’ means ‘x is an irreducible representation of the Poincare´ group’.
And it is clear that from that essential property one may deduce the existence of the
Poincare´ group, for it is the transformations of this group that define the representa-
tion. (To recap, an irreducible representation of a group is defined in terms of a set of
states that is closed under the action of the group transformations.) We may represent
this as
IRPG(x)⇒ E(G : G = PG), (19)
where ‘E(G : G = PG)’ stands for ‘there exists a group which is the Poincare´ group’
(or more simply, that the Poincare´ group exists).70 What we must do now is check that
the deduced statement cannot be universalized and thus that it passes the test alluded to
above. But it is immediately clear that it cannot. It is plainly not the case that anything
other than the Poincare´ group is the Poincare´ group; that accolade, obviously, belongs
only to that particular group itself. We may therefore confirm that it is indeed part of
the consequential essence of a relativistic particle that the Poincare´ group exists:
xE(G : G = PG). (20)
67Kantorovich [2009], pp.79 - 80.
68Lyre [2004], Section 3.2. This quote may be found repeated all over the survey literature: see, e.g.,
Ladyman and Ross [2007], p. 147; Ladyman [2007].
69While Kantorovich does attempt to articulate and defend the notion of priority that he has in mind
(see e.g. [2009], p. 664), I believe that this argument begs the question, though I cannot go into that
here.
70Just to repeat, the ontic structuralist will insist that the domain of quantification in dependence
attributions must contain structures, including group structures.
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From this, we may then derive the ontological dependence of elementary particles on
this group, just as we did before; substituting into the basic schema we obtain
xE(G : G = PG)→ x(Ex→ E(G : G = PG)), (21)
which together with (20) gives us
x(Ex→ E(G : G = PG)). (22)
We thus obtain exactly what the structuralists want – namely, the dependence of rela-
tivistic particles on the Poincare´ group, and hence on the group structure of relativistic
laws.71
Once again, therefore, we see that the central structuralist claim – that objects de-
pend upon and hence are not prior to structures – may be straightforwardly established
through Fine’s analysis. But as before, we are not yet done: insofar as we want to as-
certain whether a superior status may be accorded to group structure, and hence decide
whether it is the radical or the moderate position that represents the right philosophy
for this revolution in physics, we need to address the converse relationship between
the groups used in physics and their representations. This, however, is a more difficult
question to answer, because although structuralists (and physicists) have had plenty
to say about particles qua irreducible representations, it seems that less attention has
been paid to the ontological interpretation of group structure. Of course, it is perfectly
straightforward to say how a given group is defined mathematically – we can go and
look that up in a book – but structuralists take the statement that symmetry structure
is ontologically fundamental to be a statement about what should be regarded as fun-
damental to physical ontology.72 The question of what qualifies some, but only some,
mathematical structures to enjoy the status of aspects of physical reality is therefore
one that structuralists about physics cannot avoid facing up to; given that Fine’s anal-
ysis ties dependence to the nature of the dependent entitity, until we are clearer on this
issue there is little progress to be made on the question of whether the group structures
that structuralists promote themselves depend on objects. But there are a few things
that I think we can say, however.
The first thing to mention is that not all groups need be on a par with one another
when it comes to matters of physical interpretation. The Poincare´ group, for example,
consists of a set of operations that each have a clear physical meaning, since we know
very well what it means to boost, or rotate, or translate a physical system such as
an observer through space and time (and can indeed in principle observe that such a
transformation has taken place). This feature does not, however, seem to be a general
feature of the groups that we use in physics: the groups mentioned above that encode
facts about interactions, for example, do not in general enjoy this luxury.73 Indeed,
there appears to be no physical interpretation to be had in the case of the local gauge
71Note that this time it is a ‘rigid’ dependence: the nature of these particles qua representations of
the Poincare´ group demands not just that some group exists, but that a specific group does.
72See e.g. French and Ladyman [2003b].
73See e.g. Wigner [1968], p. 810.
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transformations that underpin the Standard Model, since such transformations may be
shown to correspond to mere changes in representation only.74
How, then, are we to do it? Something that structuralists such as French and Ladyman
have cited as a means of distinguishing the structures they wish to reify as part of their
metaphysical base from merely mathematical structures, and thus rebut the accusation
of ‘Platonism’, is to characterize them as causal.75 Now, while at that time French
and Ladyman ‘acknowledged that causal relations constitute a fundamental feature of
the structure of the world,’ this is something that Ladyman at least now seems to have
retracted.76 In any case, causality is notoriously problematic – especially when dealing
with quantum systems – and it would be nice not to have to appeal to it. Furthermore,
deciding how exactly to cash out group structures as ‘causal’ in anything like the sense
in which we regard objects as such is likely to prove difficult – not least in the absence
of a clear physical interpretation of the group in the first place.77
But there is a related and less metaphysically loaded consideration in the neighbour-
hood. Surely a very minimal, necessary condition on the physical significance of some
structures over others is that they have empirical consequences. Indeed, this is some-
thing that French and Ladyman themselves acknowledge; they ask, for example,
What makes a structure ‘physical’? Well, crudely, that it can be related
– via partial isomorphisms in our framework – to physical ‘phenomena’.
This is how physical content enters.78
Now, if symmetry structures are to be ‘related to phyical phenomena’, they must of
course be relatable to measurement. But empirical testing is all about the detection of
determinate properties – something that is made especially explicit in the basic formal-
ism of quantum mechanics, in which a measurement is represented as the obtaining
of a real eigenvalue. But this makes it clear that some reference to a group’s repre-
sentations must enter into any characterization of the group if it is to be considered
as a part of empirical reality, for it is the irreducible representations of the symme-
try groups that carry determinate values, not the symmetry groups themselves.79 The
irreps of the Poincare´ group, for example, possess determinate mass and spin; the
Poincare´ group itself clearly does not. (It clearly doesn’t make sense to ascribe mass
and spin to a set of transformations between observers.) Likewise, it is the states in
the irreps of the SU(3) flavour group that possess the determinate properties of isospin
74See e.g. Lyre [2004], p. 650. Here I mean ‘representation’ in the generic sense of mathematical
representation, not in the sense of (reducible or irreducible) group-theoretic representations.
75Op. cit., p. 75; see also French [2010], Section 4.
76Op. cit.; Ladyman and Ross [2007].
77In any case, since those who do take causation seriously often offer the fundamental determinate
properties as the ultimate locus of causal agency, the conclusion of the argument regarding the empir-
ically testable nature of structures that I am about to put forward will apply even if we choose to cash
out the physical nature of structures in causal terms.
78Op. cit.
79I stress that here I am not saying that something must itself possess determinate physical properties
to count as part of empirical reality, only that it must be suitably related to them. I would like to thank
a referee for pressing this point.
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and hypercharge that define the first three quarks; the SU(3) group does not. Putting
everything together, then, it seems that reference to representations must be included
in the definition of group structure qua denizen of physical reality, since it is only these
that can furnish the required connection with phenomena. And that, as will by now
be clear, will generate a reciprocal dependence of group structures on objects once we
turn the handle on Fine’s machinery, so that it appears to be decisively the moderate
stance that is vindicated in this case.80
All in all, while one could certainly claim that, qua mathematical abstractions, there is
no essential dependence of groups on vector spaces or their irreducible representations,
as denizens of physical reality the matter looks very different. And unless the radical
structuralist can find another way of characterizing the physical significance, including
the testability, of the groups used in particle physics that does not involve any reference
to the representations, we cannot assert that the representations have merely ‘derivative
status’. Rather, the irreducible representations and the symmetries of nature should
each be said to be ontologically dependent on the other; given the ‘reconceptualization’
of fundamental particles in terms of group-theoretic representations, that in turn means
that fundamental particles and group structures are likewise on an ontological par.
7 Concluding Remarks
In the course of this paper I firstly argued that ontic structuralism can and should
make use of Fine’s notion of dependence to articulate its core priority claims. I then
put Fine’s system to work to show that, in both the entanglement and group-theoretic
cases, the ontological dependence of objects on structure can be rigorously sustained.
In the case of entanglement structures, while the dependence of objects on structure
could be secured without any trouble, we got hamstrung in trying to either establish
or deny the existence of reciprocated dependence relations. In the context of group-
theoretic structures and their associated objects, by contrast, we were able, through a
plausible interpretation of the physical nature of group structures in empirical terms,
to mount good arguments that the dependence should postively be taken to be recipro-
cated in this case, and thus that the moderate position wins out here.
As a first conclusion, we may note that in both cases we encountered much more dif-
ficulty in assessing whether there is any dependence of structures on objects than we
did in assessing the converse. Given that Fine’s analysis ties dependence claims to
the nature of the dependent entity, this suggests that there is a lack of clarity not in
our understanding of priority but rather in our understanding of the nature of struc-
tures. And since it is precisely these entities that structuralists entreat us to regard
as constituting the very foundation of physical ontology, the fact that we struggled to
ontologically articulate these entities carries a serious message for structuralists. As
80We should note for completeness that unless there are special reasons for any one representation to
be realized, we should expect this dependence to be generic. (There may be such special reasons in the
case of the adjoint representation of the gauge symmetry groups featuring in the Standard Model, for
example, since these correspond to the gauge bosons.)
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a second conclusion, it seems that we are in a position to determinately declare that
an unqualified acceptance of the radical position is untenable, since our second case
study showed that particles do indeed have to be regarded as on a par with at least
one extremely important class of structures. That of course entails in turn that any
‘eliminative’ structuralism in which objects are purged from the fundamental basis is
likewise untenable as a general thesis about physics, since one cannot eliminate the
objects without thereby eliminating the structures – something which would clearly
be disastrous from the structuralist point of view. Radical structuralists thus cannot
maintain the two theses most closely associated with them when it comes to particle
physics: they cannot both maintain that objects must be re-conceptualized in terms
of structures and that they be eliminated, qua metaphysically secondary entities, in
favour of the associated structures.81
The net result of this discussion, then, is that the more radical claims made by ontic
structuralists must be regarded as unjustified. But what we are left with nonetheless is
a picture of the fundamental basis that is very different from that which is presented to
us by purely ‘object oriented’ metaphysics. It is a picture in which we regard elemen-
tary particles as no more fundamental than (at least some of) the dynamical structures
of contemporary physics, and in which a rich nexus of metaphysical dependencies
weaves the various entities in the fundamental basis together. Thus while I think we
all must agree that the more radical versions must be left behind, it remains the case
that ontic structuralism has a highly revisionist, and hopefully now more rigorously
supported, proposal to make to contemporary fundamental metaphysics.
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